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On the nature of dialectical antitrust
Dialectics is a method of legal reasoning, in which
the controversies between the norms are considered
as inevitable and productive. In the area of antitrust,
dialectics states that different economic values (such
as consumer welfare, economic efficiency, industrial
growth, protection of competitory process, etc.) cannot
be entirely consistent with one another and such
inconsistency is considered as the ‘‘fuel’’ for ‘‘an engine
of freedom’’.
Dialectical antitrust has at least five dimensions:
• competition in/for the markets;
• competition between public values;
• competition between the ‘‘visible’’ and ‘‘invisible’’
hands of the market;
• competition between preventive and proactive
antitrust (i.e. should competition be merely ‘‘pro-
tected’’ or does it also deserve ‘‘promotion’’?); and
• competition between antitrust theories (the actors
are scientists; the object is competition between
different doctrines of antitrust).
On the first dimension the purpose of dialectical antitrust
is to explain the necessity of the competitory process,1
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1 I try to avoid using the term ‘‘competitive process’’ and
substitute it by the more accurate notion of ‘‘competitory
which constitutes the essence of liberal democracy (in all
its political, cultural and economic dimensions). Dialec-
tical antitrust has to demonstrate why competition is
a distinctive feature of liberalism and why it deserves
its protection even in the cases where the outcomes it
proposes are neither optimal nor the most desirable.
Indeed, competition is a multidimensional phenomenon
which by its nature cannot be properly articulated. In
this sense competition is an essence, while competition
policy and law is a form; competition is a spirit, while
competition policy and law is a letter. A structure of
analysis of the correlation between essence and form has
been developed already in ancient philosophy. Those
two attributes of the object cannot be entirely coherent;
the tensions between the essence and the form have a
dialectical nature. For this reason each antitrust enforcer
should be provided with substantial room for discretion.
He has to be empowered to set up the most effective
format of competition, which should not be predeter-
mined by other public values. Competition is a thing
in itself, an independent public virtue, which deserves
its protection and promotion. In this sense competition
is a societal libido. As in the case with human beings,
libido is never sufficient to establish the individuality,
yet without libido no individuality can be established.
Thus, by recognising the importance of competition
as an independent economic value, regulators should
correlate it with other public values, which also
deserve their protection and promotion. It is the second
dimension of dialectical antitrust. Here competition as
an economic value ‘‘competes’’ with other legitimate
societal values (like consumer welfare, economic
efficiency, innovations, etc.). The task of the enforcers
is to ‘‘fine-tune’’ the regulatory system in a way that
reflects the basic expectations and priorities of society.
This research will demonstrate why the consequentialist
approach to antitrust contradicts the basic ideas of
liberal democracy, and explain why competition should
be treated on a par-in-parem principle in respect to other
economic values.
Methodologically a conflict of interests can be solved
by policymakers by applying a parentheses theory,
which proposes to undertake an analytical inclusion
of different public goals in separate ‘‘boxes’’. While
being within parentheses it is irrelevant whether any
process’’, inasmuch as the idea of ‘‘competitiveness/competitive’’
indicates the external ability to compete. Some societies/or firms
can be competitive without applying competition on the internal
level. In other words, competition is only one of many ways to
achieve competitiveness, another one being for example planned
economy (thus Chinese companies are competitive externally
but they reach their competitiveness without a competitory
process inside the country; another example would be an ‘‘anti-
competitive’’ state aid to selected Olympic teams (those which
are most likely to win the medals) which leads to an increase of
their competitiveness at the stage of Olympic games, but this is
done for the costs of reduction of competition between different
sports for the state subsidies).
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particular format of competition is beneficial or harmful
for society. It has to be explored as a thing in itself.
After performing such internal analysis, which helps to
understand the things in their entirety, they ought to be
extracted from the parentheses and contextualised into
the policymaking process. On this external level these
different public goals do compete with one another in
the process of being prioritised by policymakers.
This external competition between different economic
values leads to the third dimension of dialectical antitrust
theory, namely to the competition between the ‘‘two
hands’’ of the markets. Each economic relationship
within the market can be potentially either regulated
by enforcer or left for taking their evolutionary course.
Both options have their pros and cons, and essentially
both could be justified from the holistic perspective.
When the enforcer considers that the intervention
into the markets is necessary, he or she has to decide
whether to conduct it for the purposes of protection
of competition or its promotions. This balancing act is
explored in the fourth dimension of dialectical antitrust,
which compares the relationship between preventive
and proactive antitrust policy. This new criterion for
classification of competition law has not yet been
articulated in present-day antitrust doctrine. It goes
beyond ‘‘ex ante/ex post’’ taxonomy, inasmuch as it does
not say ‘‘when’’ to intervene, but rather, is concerned
about the purpose of such intervention. In other words,
competition can be ‘‘protected’’ by both ex ante and ex
post instruments, but it can be also promoted by using
the same ex ante/ex post tools.
The fifth dimension of dialectical antitrust reveals and
explores competitory tensions between different schools,
and doctrines ‘‘compete’’ for acceptance of their own
algorithm for solving the tensions between different
economic goods. Thus, for instance, the Ordoliberal
School would put a pattern on the constitutional
dimension (an economic freedom to compete), whereas
the Chicago School would adhere to a prioritisation
of consumer welfare, and federalists would advocate
an instrumentalisation of competition law to achieve
the goal of EC market integration, while conservatives
would defend the freedom of monopolists to profit from
their investments. The task of dialectical antitrust here
is to reassess each of these theories and to test their
applicability to different economic contexts.
Hence, on the first level dialectical antitrust explores
the essence of competition. It explains why competition
should be considered as an independent economic
virtue. On the second level it analyses how competition
must be correlated with other economic virtues
(different public values should compete with one
another to be prioritised by regulators in each
particular case). On the third level, after competition
as a public value has been already correlated with
other legitimate societal values, dialectical antitrust
investigates the tensions between regulatory intervention
and evolutionary self-development of the markets. On
the fourth level it explores the relationship between
preventive and proactive competition laws. On the fifth
level it investigates dialectical tensions between different
schools and approaches to antitrust policy and law.
Dialectical antitrust versus holistic antitrust
Dialectical antitrust is a method of understanding the
conflicts inside competition policy by considering them
as a productive tool for its development. It divides things
in order to govern them. Such ‘‘divide-et-impera’’ is a
methodology which distinguishes dialectical antitrust
from holistic antitrust. The latter seeks to build up
a harmonious homogeneous hierarchy of competition
objectives by solving the conflicts between antitrust’s
controversies. Its methodological credo would be rather
‘‘reconcilia-et-impera’’. Dialectical antirust does not deal
with political choices, considering that their ad hoc
nature leaves a considerable room for regulators and
actors to manoeuvre on a case-by-case basis.2 Dialectical
antitrust tries to understand and to explain competition.
It does not provide prescriptions.
Competition is the essence of a liberal society.3The
political aspect of competition is traditionally known
as a democracy4; competition in a cultural dimension is
commonly conceived of as pluralism5; the economic
sense of competition is reflected in the notion of
market.6 Those different dimensions of competition
have been widely explored from the perspective of
dialectic. The common denominator for all three is a
notion of competition: democracy is a competition of the
political programs, pluralism—competition of cultural
ideas, market—competition of goods and services. It
might even be said that all sorts of interactions between
autonomic entities have elements of competition. Such
‘‘Schumpeterian’’ understanding of competition as a
permanent multilevel interactive process of creative
2 Due to its dialectical and competition nature, dialectical
antitrust is much more analytical theory than political guidelines.
3 David J. Gerber, Law and Competition in Twentieth Century
Europe: Protecting Prometheus (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1998):
‘‘The genesis of the idea of protecting competition was imbedded in
the idea of protecting freedom, and thus it is important to review . . .
the role and substance of the concept of freedom . . . The institutions
and traditions of liberalism not only scripted thinking about economic
competition, but also carried its political fortunes.’’
4 The elections in a democracy play the role of an ‘‘engine’’,
which stimulates competition between the different political
programs and ideologies. The constituencies in politics can be
seen as the consumers in economics.
5 An example with pluralism shows why in competition the
‘‘journey is more important than [the] destination’’. Co-existence
and interplay between different cultures and ideas mean more
than the cumulative value of each of them.
6 Because of semantic reasons, these terms are not used
interchangeably, but their essence is mutatis mutandis very
similar if not identical.
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destruction7 constitutes the essence and the driving
force of liberal evolutionary development. We talk here
about ‘‘butterfly-effect competition’’, where everything
depends on everything else.
However, competition in such a broad sense becomes
non-regulatable, because all its actors can use conflicting
arguments excessively broadly and interchangeably.
Depending on the purpose of the interpreter and
because of the dialectical nature of the ‘‘butterfly-
effect competition’’, each economic conduct may be
considered as simultaneously harmful and beneficial
for competition. Therefore, the rational interest of
regulators is to limit the scope of competition by
reducing its meaning to easily identifiable categories.
Yet this intention inevitably leads to a decrease of the
very notion of competition, since it cuts off its less
visible elements in order to maintain the stability and
predictability of the entire regulatory system.
Each society elaborates its own unique algorithm of
priorities and balances.8 Not all economic objectives
can be achieved and not all constitutional values can
be protected in their entirety, inasmuch as the very
notion of ‘‘prioritisation of everything’’ is a contradictio
in terminis. The whole variety of goals and interests—
and competition is one of them—are too broad to be
coherent. Most of them are ‘‘merely’’ incoherent, some
fairly conflicting, whereas others are mutually exclusive.
It is up to policymakers to design the multilevel system
of checks and balances of priorities and tradeoffs. The
place of each value in the ‘‘doctrinal guidelines for
policymakers’’ depends on the importance with which
the society associates it.9
The reliance on competition as a driving force
of economic development is not self-evident. There
are different approaches to the role of competition
rules within the regulatory model of a given society.
Leaving aside developing and authoritarian regimes,
industrialised economies themselves also generate many
controversies with regard to competition.10 Competition
is not the exclusive way to achieve efficiency and
7 Joseph A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy?
(London: George Allen & Unwin, 1976):
‘‘The opening up of new markets, foreign or domestic, and the
organisational development from the craft shop and factory . . .
illustrate[s] the same process of individual mutation . . . that
incessantly destroying the old one, incessantly creating a new one. This
process of Creative Destruction is the essential fact about capitalism
[O.A.—i.e. ‘about market’].’’
8 As an artist can inlay different compositions from the same
small elements, the set of similar public values can also be laid
out in different constellations.
9 EC competition case law provides many examples, when
non-competition objectives are taken into account. Often they
prevail over competition goals. For a detailed analysis of the
correlation between competition law and other public values, see
GiorgioMonti, ‘‘Article 81 EC and Public Policy’’ (2002) C.M.L.
Rev. 39.
10 Wyatt Wells, Antitrust & The Formation of The Postwar
World (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002):
‘‘[At the beginning of the twentieth century ‘t]he enthusiasm for cartels
reflected more than the desire of business to protect itself from hard
industrial growth. Therefore the utilitarian approach
to competition, which considers its necessity only to the
extent to which competition provides efficient economic
results, may harm the very notion of competition.
Two-handed market: Manus Manum Lavat
The language of antitrust is quite euphemistic: it is
accustomed to calling some things efficient and others
abusive, while assuming that these semantically subjec-
tive categories are universal concepts. By applying this
metaphoric language to the ideal market equilibrium,
one might conclude that states use their dominant mar-
ket position and intervene into economic processes in
order to achieve different societal objectives. At least
in the categories of laissez faire, each antitrust regu-
lation constitutes ipso facto an intervention.11 There
are many reasons why public regulators exercise their
power to fine-tune the markets.12 One of the reasons
for such an intervention might be the establishment,
protection and development of competition within some
specific economic sector; another, the efficient allocation
of resources or increase of consumer welfare.13 These
aims of state intervention are on the same hierarchical
level. Sometimes competition is prioritised over con-
sumer welfare; sometimes consumer welfare has to be
seen as a value, which is more important than competi-
tion. However, there should not be any strict causational
links of subordination between these policies—at least
on the level of methodology.
The notion of an open market is inseparably linked to
the Smithian idea of the invisible hand.14 The superficial
times. . . Many in academia and government believed that cartels were
a ‘higher’ form of economic organisation that replaced the brutal ethos
of competition with a system of cooperation.’’
11 Compare Joe¨l Mone´ger in Hanns Ullrich (ed.), Competition,
Regulation and System Coherence—The Evolution of European
Competition Law. Whose Regulation, Which Competition?
(Cheltenham, United Kingdom: Edward Elgar, 2006):
‘‘Today there are no completely unregulated or completely regulated
industries. Everything is a question of degree and depends on the
health of the economy and on the ideology favoured by citizens in the
different countries throughout the world.’’
12 William J. Baumol and Robert D. Willig, Contestability:
Developments Since the Book (Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford
University Press, 1986):
‘‘Contestability theory does not, and was not intended to, lend support
to those who believe. . . that unrestrained market automatically
solves all economic problems and that virtually all regulation and
antitrust activity constitutes a pointless and costly source of economic
inefficiency.’’
13 On the affect of the legal tradition on national antitrust
doctrines and the general attitude of regulators and actors to
competition see A.E. Rodriguez, ‘‘Does Legal Tradition Affect
Competition Policy Performance?’’ (Winter 2007) 21(4) The
International Trade Journal.
14 However Smith himself acknowledged the necessity for the
limitation of certain economic behaviours: Adam Smith, An
Inquiry into the Nature And Causes of the Wealth of Nations
(Prometheus Books, 1991): ‘‘People of the same trade seldom
meet together, even for merriment and diversion, but the
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interpretation of the concept of an invisible hand gives
an impression that markets can be organised with
no external interference and that they are capable
of synergetic self-maintenance.15 According to this
uncritical approach/belief, every regulatory intervention
into the markets is believed to be a violation of the
principle of a free market economy. However, it is
utopian to antithesise free market to state regulation.16
‘‘Unregulated market’’ is contradictio in terminus,17
since the very notion of ‘‘market’’ inherently implies
the rules which regulate its functioning. The reference
to a free market as an entirely unregulated cowboy-
style arena is misleading, inasmuch as even anarchy is
subordinated to the rules by which it is defined.18 This
presumption does not make the market’s hand more
visible, but rather claims that the very idea of markets is
meaningless without their regulation.
Since regulation is indispensable for the existence
of the markets, its presence does not make them
automatically non-free. Only some regulation restricts
the freedom of markets. The same is true with
regard to the correlation between regulation and
competition. Since the traditional mindset of antitrust
lawyers considers competition only in the framework
of arts 101–106 TFEU,19 the idea of the promotion,
development and improvement of competition meets
severe opposition in our circles. It can only be contra-
balanced by the very opaque and non-critical notion of
market failure within the framework of liberalisation
policies.20
conversation ends in a conspiracy against the public, or in some
contrivance to raise prices.’’
15 For an analysis of the Ordoliberal approach to European
integration and the notion of social market economy see, i.e.
Christian Joerges and Florian Ro¨dl, ‘‘‘Social Market Economy’
as Europe’s Social Model?’’ (2004) 8 EUI Working Papers, Law.
16 This idea has well-founded ordoliberal roots. It is explained,
inter alia, in Ro¨pke’s notion of ‘‘liberal interventionism’’,
Wilhelm Ro¨pke, Wirrnis und Wahrheit. Ausgewa¨hlte Aufsa¨tze,
Erlenbach (Zurich, Stuttgart: Rentsch, 1962). Some elements of
coexistence between strong regulation and free market had been
also explored by Carl Schmidt in his notion of ‘‘authoritarian
liberalism’’.
17 The doctrinal critique of this point has been elaborated
inter alia by two Italian thinkers and politicians, Luca Einaudi
and Giuliano Amato. Luca Einaudi conditioned the markets to
their regulators, (‘‘carabineers who protect existing order’’)—in
Luca Einaudi, Riccardo Faucci and Roberto Marchionatti (eds),
Selected Economic Essays (Palgrave Macmillan, 2006). This
notion has been contextualised to the regulation of competition
by Giuliano Amato, i.e. in Antitrust and the Bounds of Power:
The Dilemma of Liberal Democracy in the History of the Market
(Hart Publishing, 1997).
18 For an analysis of different approaches to economic liberalism
see inter alia Viktor J. Vanberg, On the Complementarity of
Liberalism and Democracy (Walter Eucken Institut, Freiburg,
Institut fu¨r Allgemeine Wirtschaftsforschung; Abteilung fu¨r
Wirtschaftspolitik; Albert-Ludwigs-Universita¨t Freiburg), June
2009.
19 More in-depth analysis of this issue is provided in the section
related to proactive and preventive antitrust.
20 Those who believe that markets can exist without any
external regulation, once faced with the necessity to regulate,
Indeed, the invisible hand is an indispensable—
albeit insufficient—component of a free market.21 The
notion of the invisible hand constitutes the distinctive
feature of the market. Without it no market can exist,
and its invisibility must not be confused with non-
regulatability.22 No regulator can either fully understand
or substitute the invisible hand. At the same time an
invisible hand on its own can never suffice. It is just a
spirit, a soul of the market, which also requires its body,
its regulatory form.23 The relation between the two can
be seen only in their dialectical interdependence. The
idea of the invisible hand deals with internal incentives
and challenges, but it does not prioritise it over an
external influence on the markets by their regulators.
The invisible hand of internal incentive, challenge and
desire is inevitably predetermined and co-ordinated by
the visible hand of external regulation and rational
choice for the mutual benefit of both.24 Such external
regulation is possible within the framework of free
market and should not be seen as a trade-off between
economic freedom and political necessity. A compromise
between the two is unavoidable, but it occurs on a
higher level, as an act of political balancing, as the next
step of proactive regulation, conducted by policymakers,
who are ex officio forced to operate within the scarcity
of resources, choices and priorities. It means that not
every act of proactive regulatory intervention has to
be conceived as a reconciliation of market choice with
social interests. Not all kinds of regulations are directed
to repair market ‘‘failures’’, some are conducted to
enhance the proper functioning of the markets, others—
to substitute them.
The same applies mutatis mutandis to the process
of competition within the markets. Competition can be
strive to show why in the very specific circumstances free market
does not work. Yet the market never fails, and it does not require
an ascertaining of its failure in order to approve the external
regulatory intervention.
21 Ernst Ulrich Petersmann, ‘‘Constitutionalism and the
Regulation of International Markets: How to Define the
‘Development Objectives’ of the World Trading System?’’ (2007)
23 EUI Working Papers, Law:
‘‘Efficient market competition is no gift of nature but depends on rules
and government interventions constituting open markets, defining
rights and obligations of market actors, correcting market failures and
supplying public goods.’’
22 The discussion between economic liberals and protectionists
has a perpetual nature and rather productive consequences,
the results of which can be harmful only when some party
would definitely win them. For the history of the discussion
between advocates of ‘‘invisible’’ and ‘‘visible’’ hands in the
UK context see Frank Trentmann, Free Trade Nation (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2008).
23 This is rather economic dimension of perpetual mankind
thinking on correlation between form-and-essence, letter-and-
spirit, yin-and-yang, which has to be seen in their dialectical,
indissoluble interdependence.
24 Sometimes the choices may be not mutually beneficial—
sometimes even tragic—but sometimes they are in conformity
with the interests of all parts of the society.
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regulated in order to shape its own proper functioning.25
In this case, it would be an internal regulation, the
purpose of which would be to protect and promote
competition. However, it can also be regulated for
external purposes, such as consumer welfare.26 The next
section of this article explains why the achievement of
consumer welfare belongs to the second, external, kind
of market failures correction. The regulator is required
to intervene and the judge is ‘‘advised’’ to interpret
positive law in the most consumer-friendly way, by
using the rhetoric of ‘‘market failure’’. However, this
is an external intervention into competition, because
such regulatory intervention is not supposed to correct
failures for the benefits of a free market, but rather, to
escape the outcomes which the free market produces.
Consequently, an internal regulation of competition
is called either to protect or to promote competitory
process, whereas an external regulation of competition
strives to reconcile the most optimal competitory
process with other legitimate economic values. From
the perspective of dialectical antitrust, consumer welfare
and economic efficiency belong to the second group; they
are external with respect to competitory process. Hence
what is good for competition is not necessarily good for
consumer welfare and vice versa.
Consumer welfare ‘‘fallacy’’
Can competition be harmful to consumers? Or is it
the case that, as soon as it begins to harm them,
it is no longer ‘‘competition’’ and does not deserve
protection? To put it in ‘‘apples-and-oranges language’’:
are acid apples ‘‘less-apples’’ than sweet ones? If the
purpose of environmental policy is the protection of
the environment, if industrial policy strives to enhance
industrial growth, and agricultural policy is called
upon to develop agriculture, why should the purpose
of competition policy be something other than the
protection and promotion of competition? Is it so
only because competition is difficult (impossible) to
define, or because competition is a multidimensional
phenomenon—or just because competition is not an
economic value in itself?
The hypothesis of this paper assumes that on the
analytical level the purpose of antitrust policy is
25 Regrettably, the term ‘‘regulatory competition’’ is already
‘‘occupied’’ by comparatists in respect to the analysis of
the different regimes regulating the attraction of international
investments. In the case of competition law this term would
mean ‘‘regulation of competition’’, whereas in corporate law its
synonym would be rather ‘‘competition of regulators’’.
26 Rosita B. Bouterse, Competition and Integration—What
Goals Count? (Kluwer Law Publishers, 1994):
‘‘[I]n contrast to ‘competition law’, ‘competition policy’ has a strong
political dimension. It indicates that antitrust prohibitions amount to
measures of economic policy—at least when a particular decision is
taken with a view on the proper functioning of the given economy.’’
the protection and promotion of competition. Hence,
consumer welfare cannot be seen as the objective of
competition policy. Otherwise, the very essence of
‘‘competition’’ and ‘‘consumer welfare’’ would be barely
distinguishable. ‘‘Sweetness’’ can be an indicator of
‘‘sweet apples’’ or even of ‘‘good apples’’, but when
sweetness substitutes ‘‘appleness’’, ‘‘apples’’ transform
into ‘‘sugar’’. This gives reason for a methodological
‘‘unbundling’’ of competition from consumer welfare,
and analytical ‘‘liberalisation’’ of competition from
other public values. This is not to advocate ‘‘anti-
consumer competition law’’ or ‘‘consumer-neutral
competition law’’, but merely to protect the notions
of competition and consumer welfare from their
unequivocal non-critical ‘‘merging’’.
Consumer welfare and economic efficiency (as well
as industrial policy, manufacturing growth, social sta-
bility, promotion of innovations, fostering investments,
sustainable development, market integration, military
strength, public health, environmental cohesion, intelli-
gence security and many other legitimate societal goals)
are core public values of democratic societies. Yet com-
petition is also one of them.None of the abovementioned
interests is perused by policymakers without its cross-
checking with others, yet such balancing of values does
not deprive them from being seen as independent realms.
Since their respective scopes often overlap, this paper
proposes a dialectical ‘‘parenthesis theory’’, which anal-
yses each societal value separately as a thing-in-itself and
reconciles the conflicts between them. As Hovenkamp
eloquently points out:
‘‘Judges have spoken of antitrust law as a ‘consumer
welfare prescription’ for so long that the phrase
seldom produces anything but yawns. . . The rhetoric of
‘consumer welfare’ is very powerful. A statute declaring
protection of consumers to be the goal of antitrust would
probably pass Congress by a unanimous vote.’’27
Thus, instead of being a shield, it is becoming a sword.28
The problem with consumer welfare is that this
concept is considered as the final aim of antitrust.29
It leads to excessive expansion of its scope, which
27 Herbert Hovenkamp, The Antitrust Enterprise. Principle and
Execution (Harvard University Press, 2005).
28 This perhaps constitutes a part of ‘‘Bork’s paradox’’ (Robert
H. Bork, The Antitrust Paradox: A Policy At War With Itself
(New York: The Free Press, 1993) and paves the way for
‘‘Ullrich’s conundrum of competition of competition rules’’
(Hanns Ullrich, ‘‘Anti-Unfair Competition Law and Anti-Trust
Law: A Continental Conundrum?’’ (February 2005) EUI Law
Working Paper 2005/01).
29 Traditionally, the difference between ‘‘economic efficiency’’
and ‘‘consumer welfare’’ is recognised. When these notions are in
conflict, some authors adhere to economic efficiency (e.g. Bork,
The Antitrust Paradox: A Policy At War With Itself, 1993), but
most of them give priority to consumer welfare. See for instance
John B. Kirkwood and Robert H. Lande, The Fundamental Goal
of Antitrust: Protecting Consumers, Not Increasing Efficiency
(2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1113927 [Accessed
December 15, 2009].
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in turn deprives this concept of its original meaning.
Originally, this idea had libertarian foundations.30
Indeed, the notion of consumer welfare was initially
introduced—and, in the course of time, conceptualised—
by representatives of the Chicago School.31 They
proposed consumer welfare as a benchmark and an
external test for whether antitrust remedies have to be
applied or not. The initial idea of consumer welfare
is based upon the proposition that not every antitrust
sanction is efficient for the economy, and that violation
of competition can be counterbalanced by consequential
direct cross-benefits for the consumers. However, this
original meaning is significantly altered nowadays.
The Chicago School was inspired by a libertarian
vision of the economy, which in its pure form
considers any limitation of free trade as a violation of
competition.32 Conceptually this approach goes against
antitrust precisely because of the presumption that an
invisible hand would design the markets in a more
effective way than the visible hand of the regulators.
However, bearing in mind the existence of strong per
se rules, developed by the Ordoliberal33 and Harvard
Schools, which prohibit allegedly anti-competitory
behaviour without even taking into account their real
effect on the economy, Chicagoans began to advocate
‘‘lightweight antitrust’’ by elaborating a consumer
welfare benchmark: a conduct, which formally fulfils
the requirements of violation of competition must be
excluded from the sanctions, if it provides sufficient
benefits for the consumers.
Apparently, they overplayed. In the course of time
the successful reference to consumer welfare as a
benchmark for exclusion from antitrust sanctions has
been substantially modified.34 The regulators have
instrumentalised the concept of consumer welfare, as
a test for the non-application of antitrust remedies. This
has backfired more and more often: instead of helping
to exempt conduct from the regulatory remedies, it has
now become a universal test for applying antitrust in
30 Although the very idea of consumer welfare is central to
neoclassical economics, it has been implemented in antitrust
thinking mostly by representatives of the Chicago School.
31 Daniel A. Crane, ‘‘Technocracy and Antitrust’’ (Forthcom-
ing) 86 Tex. L. Rev.:
‘‘[Since the Chicago School revolution] antitrust enforcement has
become considerably less democratic and more technocratic. It has
become increasingly separated from popular politics, insulated from
direct democratic pressures, delegated to industrial policy specialists,
and compartmentalised as a regulatory discipline.’’
32 For an overview of the influence of the Chicago School on
modern antitrust see inter aliaWilliam E. Kovacic, ‘‘The Antitrust
Paradox Revisited: Robert Bork and the Transformation of
Modern Antitrust Policy’’ (1990) 36 Wayne Law Journal 1413.
33 For a study of Ordoliberalism see inter alia Viktor J. Vanberg,
The Freiburg School: Walter Eucken and Ordoliberalism,
FreiburgDiscussion papers on Constitutional Economics (Walter
Eucken Institut, Institut fu¨r Allgemeine Wirtschaftsforschung;
Abteilung fu¨r Wirtschaftspolitik; Albert-Ludwigs-Universita¨t
Freiburg, 2004), 04/11.
34 Essentially, distorted.
every situation where consumer welfare is ‘‘infringed’’
or even ‘‘can be increased’’.35 The consumer welfare test
is still applied by regulators for the original Chicagoan
purposes (to exempt from antitrust), but also contrary to
the purposes of the Chicago School (as an undisputable
reason for regulators to intervene). In other words,
this notion is still applicable nowadays in cases of
immunisation from antitrust remedies, but is also used
as a tool to subordinate a whole range of economic
policies to a common denominator36 (which goes against
the doctrinal premises of the Chicago School). Thus,
instead of performing its original task to keep the
regulatory system more market-friendly, the notion of
consumer welfare helps making the economy regulated
and purpose-oriented.
Because the consumer welfare test is essentially an
amorphous concept, which can be easily adopted to
justify any reasonable behaviour, this notion can be
applied not only for immunisation from antitrust, but
also for the application of antitrust as well as other
regulatory tools to certain companies and industries. The
consumer welfare benchmark was originally proposed
as a legal instrument to defend economic freedom, yet
it evolved into a universally applicable tool of proactive
industrial policy.
From the traditional neoclassical perspective, the main
sign that competition is working properly is the situation
in the markets where the barriers to entry are low and
the choices for consumers are wide. Monopolisation is
seen as a situation when a dominant undertaking may
‘‘free ride’’ on a consumer demand allowing itself not
to concentrate on the decrease of marginal costs but
rather to benefit from the lack of competition. Two
factors are decisive to show that competition is limited:
(i) high barriers to entry; and (ii) a limited amount of
competitors.
Yet those criteria have to be contested, inasmuch as
they are designed only to show the consumer dimension
of competition. Competition in such a construct is
seen merely as the ability of the consumers to choose
35 Eleanor M. Fox, ‘‘We Protect Competition, You Protect
Competitors’’ (2003) 26(2) World Competition 149:
‘‘Consumer welfare operationalised as aggregate consumer surplus
provided a benchmark that was a check against antitrust enforcement.
It stood for the admonition that antitrust law would not be invoked
unless a particular challenged practice decreased aggregate consumer
surplus. Given the presumption of market and business efficiency, it
seldom did.’’
36 For the proactive approach to consumer welfare see Eugene
Buttigieg, ‘‘Consumer Interests Under the EC’s Competition
Rules on Collusive Practice’’ (2005) European Business Law
Review:
‘‘Unfortunately, in the past, US and EC antitrust law only indirectly
promoted and safeguarded consumer interests while occasionally their
application might even have led to a result that was at variance with
consumer expectations as the economic efficiency goal now pursued
by both systems is not coterminous with a fully fledged consumer well-
being objective that takes into account wealth transfer. . . while the
myriad of goals simultaneously informing EC competition law prevent
it from serving as a true means of consumer well-being maximisation.’’
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between different sellers.37 Competition in the market is
considered as more desirable for political reasons, since
it provides tangible results for the consumer welfare.
Furthermore, it is quite predictable and achievable in
a short term. On the contrary, competition for the
markets is traditionally considered to be a bad option
for consumers, since instead of improving their goods
and services, companies concentrate their efforts rather
on business-to-business and business-to-government
relationships.38 Thus, from the utilitarian perspective of
political economy priorities, competition in the markets
has more proactive effects than competition for the
markets.
However, the idea of competition is not exhausted by
utilitarian considerations about the benefits it produces
for consumers. On the analytical level, regardless of
its practical usefulness, both kinds of competition still
remain competition in the proper sense of the word
and even if a fierce competition for the markets does not
bring about direct short-term benefits for the consumers,
it does not become ‘‘not-competition’’ or (even) ‘‘less-
competition’’. Regardless of their practicability as a
political choice, all sorts of competition have to
be analysed, since their political usefulness is not
a distinctive feature, which is sufficient to separate
desirable kinds of competition from other forms of
competition.39 This is why the consumer welfare
criterion does not serve properly when we need to
see what is decisive for competition as a theoretical
phenomenon.40 Consumer-friendly competition merely
points out what is decisive for desirable competition.
The reference to the consumer as an ultimo ratio of
competition moves the debates from the level of theory
to the level of policies. However, this shift remains to
37 Ludvig von Mises in Bettina Bien Greaves (ed.), Human
Action, A Treatise on Economics (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund,
2007):
‘‘The classical economists favoured the abolition of all trade barriers
preventing people from competing on the market. Such restrictive
laws, they explained, result in shifting production from those places in
which natural conditions of production are more favourable to places
in which they are less favourable. They protect the less efficient man
against his more efficient rival. . . In short they curtail production and
thus lower the standard of living.’’
38 Michael L. Katz and Howard A. Shelanski, ‘‘‘Schumpeterian’
Competition and Antitrust Policy in High-Tech Markets’’ (2005)
14 Competition 47:
‘‘Many empirical studies fail to account for the fact that market
structure itself might be affected by the perceived possibilities for
innovation and that market structure might therefore be a result,
rather than a cause, of innovation incentives.’’
39 The ‘‘neutrality’’ of competition on its ontological level has
been recognised by many authors. For an analysis of the different
formats of competition from the perspective of public policy see
Thomas Eilmansberger, ‘‘How to Distinguish Good From Bad
Competition Under Article 82: In Search of Clearer and more
Coherent Standards For Anticompetitive Abuses’’ (2005) C.M.L.
Rev. 42.
40 For scientific purposes, a non-cancerous growth and a
malignant growth are both tumours. It would be an absurd
obscurantism to refuse to analyse the latter due to its badness for
the organism.
be conceptually un-captured: we still keep calling it
competition as a whole, while in fact it covers only a
fraction of the entire phenomenon of competition (i.e.
only a desirable, consumer-friendly competition).
Antitrust taxonomy
After conducting an analysis of the nature of antitrust
and of its goals,41 it is necessary to explore the
legal forms in which competition law and policy
exist. Traditional antitrust scholarship distinguishes
competition policies predominantly on the criterion of
their object of regulation (i.e. cartel law, antimonopoly
law, merger law) or time of regulatory intervention (i.e.
ex ante and ex post). In addition to this classification,
dialectical antitrust introduces an additional criterion,
which differentiates competition law depending on the
purpose of its functioning: proactive and preventive
antitrust.42
As has been already persuasively demonstrated by
some authors,43 those parts of sector-specific regulation
(SSR), which are related to liberalisation, at the same
time belong to competition law. The reality that
those instruments substantially differ from traditional
antitrust does not negate the fact that this law still
regulates competition and there is no reason to exclude
this legal tool from competition doctrine. SSR still
has to be distinguished from traditional competition
law, and their differentiation can be presented in
classical for European integration terms proactive and
preventive, which refer to methods of regulation. Due
to the specific legal nature of SSR, and its distinctive
impact on competition, this paper presupposes that
the biggest part of SSR as well as merger regulation
belong to proactive competition law, whereas traditional
antitrust in terms of arts 101–106 TFEU is preventive
competition law.44 As has been pointed above, the
provisions of art.101(3) TFEU cannot be considered
41 Bork, The Antitrust Paradox (New York: The Free Press,
1993): ‘‘Antitrust policy cannot be made rational until we are
able to give a firm answer to one question: What is the point
of the law—what are its goals? Everything else follows from the
answer we give.’’
42 The idea of proactive and preventive competition law can
be also applicable in other jurisdictions, which do not pursue
implicit goal of their political and economic integration, yet
in regard to the EU this approach appears to be even more
appropriate.
43 See, e.g. Pierre Larouche,Competition Law andRegulation in
European Telecommunications (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2000);
GiorgioMonti, ‘‘Article 81 EC and Public Policy’’ (2002) C.M.L.
Rev. 39; Heike Schweitzer, ‘‘Competition Law and Public Policy:
Reconsidering an Uneasy Relationship. The Example of Art. 81’’,
EUI Working Papers, Law 2007/30, Florence, 2007.
44 Joe¨l Mone´ger, ‘‘Competition, Regulation and System
Coherence’’ in Hanns Ullrich (ed.), The Evolution of European
Competition Law. Whose Regulation, Which Competition?
(Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2006), talks about this feature
of antitrust, but he sees it rather as a trend than a rule:
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as competition law sensu stricto, but rather as an
intermediary between competition and other European
policies, since those provisions stipulate the conditions
under which competition law is not applicable due to
priorities, which are given to other legitimate interests
in society.
The present criterion for classification of different
regulatory policies in competition as ‘‘ex ante–ex post’’
remains very relevant in most of the cases, and the
criterion of ‘‘proactive–preventive regulation’’ does not
substitute and merely complement the former. Yet, they
remain as different criteria, since ‘‘ex post–ex ante’’
classification refers to the time of the regulation, while
the ‘‘proactive–preventive’’ dimension talks about the
tool of regulation. The former taxonomy does not
provide us with an answer to what- and when-policy,
but rather tells us how-policy. In other words, the same
purposes can be achieved by applying ex post as well
as ex ante tools interchangeably in order to protect
competition (i.e. preventive antitrust), as well as to
improve it (proactive antitrust).
The differentiation of proactive from preventive
antitrust provides a clear-cut separation between two
distinctive legal instruments, which regulate the same
object—competition. While preventive competition law
strives to protect the existing level of competition within
the market, its proactive counterpart seeks to establish,
develop or improve competition. The essential difference
between those instruments is only one of methodology,
and not one of substance. Inasmuch as no market can
exist without regulation, the same is implied with regard
to competition: traditional antitrust limits competition
in order to ensure its protection, whereas SSR limits it
in order to ensure its development.45
‘‘[W]ith regulation the approach is a proactive one, whilst with
competition it is preventive. . . Regulation is mostly ex ante
mechanism, while competition assessments are traditionally made ex
post. But this is not true in all cases. . . From the outset, competition
rules were only some of the tools of the regulatory system in force.
At least, it seems that this was the case in the USA. So one of the
questions to answer is whether or not the same is true of the EU legal
system. In other words, is competition part of regulation or not and
vice versa, or should they be considered as separate areas within the
legal system?’’
There are, however much more opponents than supporters of
this idea: Hovenkamp, The Antitrust Enterprise. Principle and
Execution (2005):
‘‘[A]ntitrust is not a proactive administrative enterprise such as the
regulation of retail electricity, where a government agency sets rates,
decides when plants need to be built or modernised, and determines
how much should be invested in developing new technologies. Opting
to have antitrust at all entails a belief that in most cases the market
will produce the correct amount of competition and innovation. All
antitrust must do is see to it that the market functions reasonably well.
This requires the creation of a few second-order incentives to develop
the proper market structures and to discourage anticompetitive
practices. By ‘second order’ I mean that antitrust is largely reactive—
for example, it never decides when firms should merge or create
internal distribution systems; but it may pass judgment on the legality
of such decisions once private firms have made them on their own.’’
45 This is, perhaps, the reason why states are usually not
responsible for the violation of antitrust rules themselves.
Application of art.10 EC (repealed at Lisbon) (which requires
The doctrine of European integration and studies
on federalism demonstrate that the distinction between
proactive and preventive regulatory policies (i.e. positive
integration and negative integration) are always more
technical than structural, they are much more important
in the domain of law than in those of political sciences
and economics. In fact, the borderline between both
is very washed out, because, often the best way to
protect something is its promotion and vice versa.
This interaction between proactive and preventive
competition law represents another dimension of
productive destruction, which is so inevitable for
dialectical antitrust, since it gives a fuel to the whole
functioning of this regulatory machinery. It is very
likely, that this notion would be contested by the
mainstream antitrust scholarship, which traditionally
contradistinguishes SSR to competition law, and the
conflict between them exists indeed, yet it has a
procedural nature.46 The methodology of preventive
antitrust has its well-developed judicial and doctrinal
jurisprudence, it went through a long evolutionary
process; preventive antitrust is legally predictable it
covers a wide variety of contexts. The legal nature
of SSR by definition is much more purpose-oriented and
it is characterised by its ad hoc essence: it is supposed to
regulate ‘‘market failures’’, and ideally it shall disappear
after the correction.
Proactive competition law does not necessarily
regulate markets in a much stricter manner than
preventive antitrust. Technically, the instruments of
proactive competition can be applied to soften the
existing system of preventive antitrust. Proactive
and preventive competition law are different legal
instruments, however their differences are often not
precisely articulated. Neither economists nor political
scientists shall consider the purposes of both instruments
as distinctive from one another—they diverge only from
the legal perspective. Both traditional antitrust and
SSR restrict ‘‘free’’ competition in order to liberate
it. SSR provides such liberation via the introduction
of competition into originally closed markets, whereas
preventive antitrust performs the same task by protecting
from Member States, ‘‘to take all appropriate measures, whether
general or particular, to ensure fulfilment of the obligations
arising out of this Treaty or resulting from action taken by
the institutions of the Community. They shall facilitate the
achievement of the Community’s tasks’’) in conjunction with
arts 101–106 TFEU is actually an exception, which has to be
interpreted with an emphasis on obligations arising out of this
Treaty rather than on Member States as antitrust enforcers.
These provisions establish a hierarchical subordination between
regulators. The same rationale applies to state aid rules.
46 Damien Geradin, Robert O’Donoghue, ‘‘The Concurrent
Application of Competition Law and Regulation: the Case of
Margin Squeeze Abuses in the Telecommunications Sector’’, The
Global Competition Law Centre Working Papers Series, GCLC
Working Paper 04/05 (latter version in (2005) 1(2) Journal
of Competition Law and Economics) provide a comprehensive
analysis of the main potentialities of procedural conflicts between
competition law and SSR.
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competition if it already exists in a given market.
Usually, however, the relations between those tools are
seen in a ‘‘regulation versus competition’’ paradigm,
which is misleading, since both are a form of regulation
and both are dealing with competition.
Conclusions: productive deconstruction
of dialectical antitrust
The main idea behind this article was to perform
a theoretical analysis of the purposes and tools of
antitrust policy and law. An ancient dialectical method
has been applied to separate different components of
competition policy with the following deconstruction
of the conflicting essence of those elements without
inevitable evening-out the distinctions between them.
Dialectical antitrust demonstrates why competition
deserves to be explored independently from other
legitimate economic goals and that the primary purpose
of competition law logically is protection (via preventive
antitrust, i.e. arts 101–106 TFEU) and promotion (via
proactive antitrust, i.e. sector-specific regulation) of
competition.
Dialectical antitrust does not deny that consumer
welfare47 constitutes a meta-goal of modern competi-
tion policy. Indeed in the hierarchy of economic values
consumer welfare remains decisive, but methodologi-
cally it is neither exhausted nor entirely embraced by
competition law, which exists in order to regulate com-
petition. Sometimes competition and consumer welfare
overlap and go hand in hand, whereas at other times
they may not be entirely consistent, or even conflict.
In this case, it is up to the regulator to decide which
value has to be given priority at the expense of the
other.48 It is a fiction to suggest that consumer welfare
choice would always prevail. No theory is prescriptive
enough to provide a sufficient empirical guideline for
policymakers.
It is difficult to contest that what is not beneficial
for consumers is bad for society, but the idea of
competition cannot be reduced only to its proactive
elements. Otherwise, such utilitarian antitrust can
exist even if the idea of competition is completely
withheld from its regulatory purposes. Semantically, the
existence of bad or undesirable competition does not
make this competition anti-competitive. Competition
can be good and bad, and bad competition is still
47 To the extent to which—in one way or another—consumer
welfare constitutes a meta-aim of all areas of law and policies.
48 Ideologically, competition does not have to prevail over
consumer welfare too often. The nineteenth century’s scientific
Darwinian beliefs in competition as an exclusive tool for progress
have to be counterbalanced by more moderate methods of
efficient economic development of the twenty-first century.
competition,49 just as well as acid apples remain apples
to the same extent as their sweet congeners.50 Indeed,
theoretically, competition is not always the best option
to increase consumer welfare; otherwise, the notions
of ‘‘competition’’ and ‘‘consumer welfare’’ would be
identical. It is true that from the perspective of the
regulator, not every form of competition deserves to be
protected or promoted. In fact, regulation of competition
is not a zero-sum game,51 and the regulator is responsible
for designing the most appropriate balance between
different values and goals for the society. The position
of regulator has to be active even in the system, which is
governed by the principles of an open market economy
with free competition, since the notion of free market
inherently includes its external regulation, inasmuch as
the idea of an invisible hand is a crucial, decisive and
inevitable—but not sufficient—regulatory tool of liberal
economy.
The political art of reconsolidation of different, often
conflicting, values and rights is another important
phenomenon, which also has to be explored separately.
Depending on the societal and regulatory priorities,
various economic values and different models of compe-
tition can get priority over other values and models, but
their prioritisation over regulation is not supposed to
have an impact on the internal nature of the values and
models themselves. Epistemic parentheses perform the
cognitive role of separator, which enables the creation
of an internal space for each distinctive notion.
Antitrust theory has striven for a long time to reconcile
the apparent dilemma between the aspiration to protect
the freedom of undertakings to benefit from their
successful competition on one hand, and the freedom of
their less successful counterparts to participate in this
competition on the other; to provide for firms liberal
environment on the one hand and to fine-tune their
behaviour in order to establish legal predictability and
economic efficiency on the other; to protect competition
on the one hand and maximise common benefits for
society on the other.52 Essentially, those three crucial
49 David J. Gerber, Law and Competition in Twentieth Century
Europe, 1998: ‘‘Competition has been both God and devil
in Western civilization. It has promised and provided wealth,
undermined communities and challenged moral codes.’’
50 The other side of the equation is, ‘‘not everything that is good
for consumer welfare is competition’’.
51 Compare with partially different approach: Oliver Black,
Conceptual Foundations of Antitrust (Cambridge University
Press, 2005):
‘‘There is a difference between ‘competition’ and ‘rivalry’. The latter
is a zero sum game, by which the gains of one directly correspond to
losses of another, whereas competition envisages possibility of mutual
benefits.’’
52 In the regulatory environment, this dilemma has been
traditionally known as an ‘‘antitrust swinging pendulum’’. See
William E. Kovacic, ‘‘TheModern Evolution of U.S. Competition
Policy Enforcement Norms’’ (2003) 73 Antitrust Law Journal:
‘‘One common narrative of U.S. antitrust history depicts federal
enforcement policy since 1960 as a swinging pendulum. In this
narrative, federal antitrust enforcement swings through three phases:
[2010] E.C.L.R., ISSUE 4  2010 THOMSON REUTERS (LEGAL) LIMITED AND CONTRIBUTORS
164 ANDRIYCHUK: DIALECTICAL ANTITRUST: [2010] E.C.L.R.
dimensions of the competition dilemma can be solved
within the framework of dialectical antitrust, which on
the level of methodology proposes to utilitise those
conflicts by placing their different components into
separate parentheses. On a substantial level, the idea
of regulated freedom, which is advocated in this paper,
has been conceptually elaborated by the Ordoliberal
School of antitrust.53 Yet the article proposes a shift in
antitrust taxonomy of economic constitution, from the
emphasis on the rights of competitors (as a possibility
to compete freely) to the right of competition as
such. This constitutional status of competition would
allow it to be protected and promoted by regulators
regardless of its external efficiency and useful impact
on other societal goals, like consumer welfare. In
such a constellation, this approach to antitrust would
too active in the 1960s and 1970s, too passive in the 1980s, and
properly moderate in the 1990s.’’
53 See inter alia David J. Gerber, ‘‘Constitutionalising the
Economy: German Neo-Liberalism, Competition Law and
The ‘New’ Europe’’ (1994) 42(1) The American Journal of
Comparative Law:
‘‘Despite its enormous importance, ordoliberal thought—and German
neo-liberal thought generally—has received little attention in the
English-speaking world, and it remains all but unknown in the United
States. Moreover, except in Germany, awareness of these ideas has
been confined almost exclusively to economists, while lawyers and
political scientists have seldom been exposed to them. Finally, there
has been little modern study of the impact of these ideas on the
development of European thought.’’
allow to consider competition without its conceptual
bundling with consumer welfare, which is perceived
as a phenomenon, outside of the genuine concern of
competition policy and law.
The importance of dialectical antitrust is not only
theoretical. It provides regulators and practitioners with
the possibility to perform an additional compliancy
test in order to check the impact of the conduct at
issue on competition and consumer welfare separately.
Because of its value-neutrality, it can be applied in both
directions: to justify stronger regulatory intervention
of policymakers, if regulatory measure can protect or
develop competition, or to defend allegedly anticom-
petitive behaviour, if an undertaking would manage
to show that potential harm for consumer welfare is
counterbalanced with proactive effects for competition.
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